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NAVIGATING THE NEW MILITARY
COMMISSIONS:  THE CASE OF DAVID HICKS
Joshua L. Dratel1
Good afternoon.  I’d like to thank CUNY Law School for hav-
ing me—to Professor Sameer Ashar for extending an invitation, to
Professor Jeff Kirchmeier, and to Mohammad Faridi.
I am the civilian counsel for David Hicks, who is an Australian
detainee at Guantánamo, and the subject of a military commission
that will begin with his arraignment.2
In that context, I apologize because I am essentially a stand-in
for my co-counsel, Marine Corps Major Michael Mori, who would
have been here, but who has to travel down to Guantánamo earlier
than I do for the commission proceedings.  The reason I apologize
is because it deprives you of the rather ironic circumstance of a
uniformed United States Marine Corps officer condemning these
military commissions, which has in no short order deservedly made
him somewhat of a folk hero in Australia, but at the same time the
object of much criticism from the chief prosecutor for the military
commissions.  I have taken the latter as a supreme compliment of
Major Mori’s work.
Now to speak about David Hicks.  The military prosecutor in
the commissions has sworn charges against three detainees.  How-
ever, David Hicks has been the only one thus far referred to a mili-
1 Criminal defense attorney in New York City who represents David Hicks, an
Australian detainee who was held at Guantánamo Bay until May 2007.  Joshua L.
Dratel is a past President of the New York State Association of Criminal Defense Law-
yers and serves the Board of Directors of the National Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers (NACDL).  He is Co-Chair of NACDL’s Amicus Curiae Committee and
its Select Committee on Military Tribunals.  He is also a member of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, and serves on its Capital Punishment Committee.
Mr. Dratel is co-editor (along with Karen J. Greenberg) of THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE
ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Cambridge University Press:  2005). He is a graduate of Colum-
bia University and Harvard Law School.
2 An Australian citizen captured by U.S. forces in Afghanistan in November 2001
and transported  to Guantánamo Bay in January 2002, where he remained in custody
until late May 2007.  In August 2004, before a Guantánamo Bay military commission,
Hicks pleaded not guilty to charges of conspiracy, attempted murder, and aiding the
enemy.  Those charges were dismissed after the U.S. Supreme Court issued Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, the June 29, 2006 decision invalidating that incarnation of the military com-
missions.  Hicks was re-charged in February 2007 under a new military commission
system following enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006. See infra, at ns.
8 & 12.
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tary commission.  The other two detainees are still waiting for
formal commission charges to be instituted against them.
The rules of the military commission process have been much
discussed in articles and journals.  Just to illustrate for you some of
the essential features, it is a completely rigged process that is osten-
sibly designed to mirror the court-martial process, but in fact has
been manipulated to create certain very important exceptions to
that court-martial system.
For example, with respect to competency of the evidence, the
rules are such that what we may confront at a commission trial is
not live witnesses, who might testify, “I saw so and so do such and
such,” but rather an interrogator who will say, “Ms. X told me that
Mr. Y did the following,” or, even one step further removed, “Mr. X
told me that Mr. Y told him that Mr. Z did the following.”
Thus, there will likely be multiple levels of hearsay introduced,
which will deprive the defense of four means of valuable cross-ex-
amination and impeachment.  First, we will not be able to probe
the memory or the specific veracity of the declarant who made the
statements that would be read into the record by the interrogator.
Second, we will be deprived of the opportunity to probe the cir-
cumstances under which the statements were made:  after how
much interrogation?  After what kind of interrogation methods
were used?  Did they include torture or other forms of coercion?
Third, we will not be able to inquire of the detainees if they in
fact even made those statements that the interrogator attributes to
them. We will not be able to determine whether the statements
were made in a different language, or whether the interpreter
translated accurately.  We would not have access to the interpreters
or their notes, or the original contemporaneous handwritten notes
made by the interrogators.  Fourth, we will not be able to explore
and exploit any underlying bias that might be a factor in the de-
tainee making statements, including whether they harbor any ill
will towards the defendant.
In that context, it is important to note that many of the inter-
rogations, particularly early on in the process, and particularly
those not conducted or supervised by civilian law enforcement
agencies such as the FBI, were conducted in a totally unprofes-
sional way.  In my 25 years as a criminal defense lawyer I have wit-
nessed enough interrogations—with clients who are cooperating
with the government—to know the difference between profes-
sional and unprofessional methods.  The unprofessional way is to
tell detainee Mr. X, “Mr. Y is saying ABC about you, and we are
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interested to know what you can tell us about Mr. Y.”  That is a very
unprofessional way to conduct an interrogation because it creates
several incentives to incriminate, exaggerate, or lie.  A natural reac-
tion to such a statement by an interrogator is for the detainee to
think, “Oh Mr. Y is saying incriminating things about me, so why
don’t I say incriminating things about him?”
That is the case regardless of whether such statements about
Mr. Y are true, as Mr. X may just be angry at Mr. Y for talking about
him, and retaliating in kind, or because Mr. X, since the interro-
gators have made their interest in Mr. Y known, sees informing on
Mr. Y as a means of improving his conditions of confinement and
other aspects of his detention.  A person is capable of making up
anything under those circumstances, whether in an effort to re-
duce their own troubles, or simply out of spite and fear:  “if Mr. Y is
going to rat on me, I’m going to rat on him.”  Of course, Mr. Y may
not be saying anything to the interrogators, but this is part of the
psychological game that interrogators play, and Mr. X will not have
a verifiable means of knowing one way or the other.  The second
part of the equation is that by telegraphing to a detainee what the
interrogator wants to hear, the interrogator is providing the de-
tainee a ticket to all the benefits the interrogators can provide.
Further, an essential part of this whole drama, which began in
Afghanistan and then continued at Guantánamo, is that every sim-
ple human, daily indulgence of life, whether it be food or a shower
or a clean t-shirt, or whatever you can imagine, was available to a
detainee at the whim of the interrogators.  As a result, the detain-
ees’ philosophy developed accordingly:  if you want to be treated
remotely like a human being, or enjoy the advantages of special
treatment, then tell the interrogators what they tell you they want
to hear.  That way you can get the essentials of life you are other-
wise being denied.
That describes just some of the problems we face with respect
to the integrity—or lack thereof—of the evidence at these commis-
sions.  Another example of how unfair these commissions are, and
are intended to be, relates to regulations governing the lawyers for
the defendants.  A provision in the regulations states that if the
presiding officer or the Secretary of Defense, who is not a lawyer,
issues a rule for the purposes of practice in the military commis-
sions, that rule supersedes the ethical rules of professional respon-
sibility that bind every lawyer licensed in the United States.3  For
me, those ethical rules would be those governing lawyers practicing
3 The Manual for Military Commissions was published on January 18, 2007, to
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in the State of New York.  For Major Mori, it would be the Massa-
chusetts rules.
The rules also apply differently to military and civilian defense
counsel.  If a military lawyer such as Major Mori were to stand up
and object to a particular commission rule of practice that has
been promulgated because it is in conflict with the State of Massa-
chusetts ethical rules, Major Mori would then be removed from the
case.  If it is a civilian lawyer like me who objects, then I have a
choice to either withdraw from the case altogether, or, if I decide
to proceed despite my reservations about the conflict in rules, that
objection is forever waived.4  This is the legal environment the gov-
ernment is creating in Guantánamo.  The government could not
exclude or remove lawyers from the process entirely, so it’s trying
the next best thing:  create a wholly different paradigm of what a
lawyer is, and deny the detainees the right to zealous counsel which
we are all obligated to provide to our clients.
In the more than three years that I have been representing
David Hicks, who was a defendant in the first round of commis-
sions in 2004—which were invalidated by the Supreme Court last
year5—one of the bitter ironies is that those original, fundamen-
tally flawed commissions were endorsed by the Australian govern-
ment, which expressed its support for them and the U.S.
government’s handling of Guantánamo.6  When the Supreme
Court struck down those commissions7 for the reasons we argued
from the beginning, there was no acknowledgment, by Australia or
the U.S., that there was any merit to our objections—that we were
right and they were wrong, and that any new system had to meet
certain standards of fairness.
Instead, the government devised another flawed system.8
Again, it did not quite match the court-martial model because
there were important things about evidence, which I’ve discussed
already, and other facets of the process that in the court-martial
system are simply too fair to be applied to the Guantánamo detain-
ees.  The government does not want to make this new commission
implement the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a, et seq. See Rule
109(b)(1).
4 Id.
5 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 26 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (5–3 decision holding the Guantá-
namo military commissions illegal under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the
Geneva Conventions).
6 Law Council of Australia, The Australian Government’s Position on David Hicks,
(Dec. 6, 2006), http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/get/media/2431031696.pdf.
7 See supra note 5.
8 The Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a, et seq.
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process fair.  And when it was revealed, we went back to the same
people who were wrong the first time, to say the new process still
had intractable problems, but there is absolutely no recognition on
their part that they could be wrong again—indeed, they act as if
they got it right the first time.
Consequently, we will again be in court to challenge the new
commissions, whether the available avenue is habeas corpus or the
newly created statutory mechanism that funnels all appeals directly
to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia for
review of commission trials.9
The government’s attitude has other aspects that are as troub-
ling as they are confusing.  One of the hardest things about the
commission process is its incoherence.  I always thought that an
incompetent adversary was the most difficult adversary, aside from
the lawyer with only one client, which is always a problem.  Those
are the old adages about lawyers and clients.  But I have learned
that, in fact, the hardest adversary to confront is one without any
plan of action.  It is that type of adversary we face in the commis-
sion process.
Here is a prime example that is emblematic not only of the
lack of any plan, but also of the treatment to which detainees are
subjected.  The new commission statute and manual provide that
the prosecutor shall serve the charges upon the defendant.10  In
David Hicks’ case, the first and only one thus far in this incarnation
of the commissions, the prosecutors traveled to Guantánamo to
serve the charges on him.  They did not give us notice, or inform
David in advance.  While the purpose of the service requirement is,
of course, that an accused be made aware of the charges he faces,
the day before the prosecutors served the charges David was, with-
out his knowledge or consent (but under the guise of being a new
medication for his chronic stomach pain), administered a powerful
sedative that knocked him out.  As a result, when the prosecutors
arrived at the prison facility the next day, David was effectively cata-
tonic.  He even fell asleep standing up and hit his head on a metal
door.  Yet he was read the charges while in that condition.  That is
what the prosecutors and those who manage the detention con-
sider “notice.”11  They had no plan other than what occurred to
them on the spur of the moment:  let’s incapacitate him for the
requisite provision of notice.
9 Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 2930 (2007).
10 See Military Commissions Act, § 948q(b).
11 See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4.
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From day to day, from hour to hour, from case to case, there is
no plan.  We have no idea what the government has in store be-
cause it does not know.  It is all completely and hopelessly ad hoc,
which I would not have believed when I first became involved, but
which now has been revealed as just part of a rather distressing
pattern in more areas of this administration’s operations than just
Guantánamo and these military commissions.
Here is another example:  we are going to Guantánamo for
Monday’s proceedings, and by “we,” I mean almost one hundred
people—military personnel, media, NGO representatives.  How-
ever, the regulations that govern my participation in the commis-
sion have yet to be written and will not be completed by Monday.
There are no regulations yet for dozens and dozens of aspects of
the commissions that are integral to any criminal justice system
that considers itself legitimate, or merits characterization as such.
Yet we are moving forward in the absence of governing regula-
tions for virtually the entirety of the commission process.  The rea-
son is the political situation in Australia.  The Australian people,
the Australian legal community, and members of the Australian
government, both majority and opposition, have expressed such
strong displeasure with the Australian government’s abandonment
of David to these unfair and unjust commissions, and have cam-
paigned for David’s release after more than five years of purgatory,
to the point where David’s predicament has become an authentic
issue in this year’s federal elections in Australia.
The Australian public and legal community, and some politi-
cians there, have realized that the allegations against David have
evolved from him being “the worst of the worst” according to the
Secretary of Defense, and a “murderer” according to the President,
to the first three charges in the prior commissions, none of which
involved murder or any violent conduct.  In the new commission,
the allegations have been reduced to two charges sworn by the
prosecutor, with only one approved by the convening authority for
referral to a commission.  And that charge, which again does not
allege any violence on David’s part, was not even a crime at the
time David allegedly committed it.
Consequently, navigating the commission process for David is
very difficult because there is no predictability.  There is no way to
develop a strategy that you can have confidence will be consistent
or applicable from day to day, month to month, or year to year.
Major Mori and I have been at this for more than three years now,
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and there has not been any fundamental or meaningful
improvement.
Obviously, our objective remains to get David out of Guantá-
namo.  Another irony in facing the commission process is that
David is among the “lucky” ones because he could be convicted
tomorrow and sent back to Australia promptly, and perhaps freed
as soon as he arrived there.12  Yet there are 300–400 others who
have no time horizon at all, and no possibility for any adjudication
for their situation.  That is extraordinary and untenable.  While
that is obviously one of the fundamental problems of the Guantá-
namo situation, and these military commissions, the government
seeks to deflect criticism by accusing us, the defense lawyers, of de-
laying the commissions.  The irony is that had we gone forward
with the first commissions, David would probably have been back
in Australia by now, and not subject to these new commissions.
We challenged the initial commissions, and continue to chal-
lenge these replacement versions, because they are unfair and do
not offer a legitimate criminal justice system that is capable of mak-
ing an accurate and fair determination of who is a war criminal and
who is not, and who did something that is worth punishing.
Finally, there is the question of how much punishment is ap-
propriate for the particular type of conduct these detainees may
have committed, assuming they committed any at all?  Those con-
victed of serious crimes in ordinary U.S. courts serve less time than
the Guantánamo detainees, many of whom have been confined at
Guantánamo for more than five years without any opportunity to
defend themselves or have their cases heard13 except to appear
before a kangaroo court, the Combatant Status Review Tribunals.14
12 On March 31, 2007, Hicks became the first Guantánamo detainee to be con-
victed (by plea of guilty) under the U.S. military commission system implemented
pursuant to the MCA.  Although sentenced to seven years imprisonment, the terms of
his plea bargain required only an additional two months of imprisonment at Guantá-
namo Bay (and repatriation to Australia within 60 days), and seven more months’
imprisonment in Australia. Hicks was flown back to Australia on May 20, 2006, to
serve out the remainder of that sentence.  He was released from Australian custody
December 29, 2007.
13 Amnesty International, United States of America:  Justice Delayed and Justice Denied?
Trials Under the Military Commissions Act (Mar. 22, 2006), available at http://web.
amnesty.org/library/index/engAMR510442007.
14 Combatant Status Review Tribunal hearings began on July 30, 2004.  The hear-
ings were set up by the Defense Department following the Supreme Court’s rulings in
Rasul v. Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, which affirmed the rights of Guantánamo detain-
ees to challenge their detentions. See also Human Rights First, Human Rights First Ana-
lyzes DOD’s Combatant Status Review Tribunals, available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.
org/us_law/detainees/status_review_080204.htm.
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The government presents to you as your “personal representa-
tive,”15 a military official who is not even a lawyer, with whom the
detainee does not enjoy an attorney–client privilege, and who is
functionally incapable of assisting a detainee in presenting his ac-
count of events.  Such is the tribunal Khalid Shaikh Mohammed16
appeared before.  All of these problems create multiple issues for
us as lawyers that we navigate day-by-day, and will continue to do so
on David’s behalf until we succeed in getting him home to Austra-
lia.17  Thank you very much.
15 Id.
16 Former member of al Qaeda and captured in March 2003 by Pakistani police.
For a number of years, Mohammed’s whereabouts were unknown until it was revealed
that in late 2006 he had been moved to Guantánamo Bay.  In March 2007, he con-
fessed in a closed hearing of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal to orchestrating
September 11th, the Richard Reid shoe bomb incident, the Bali nightclub bombing,
and the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. See Jonathan Karl, ‘High-Value’
Detainees Transferred to Guantánamo, http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=
2400470.
17 See supra note 1.
